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The Theory and Politics of First-Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme
Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?

Why does the Supreme Court favor free expression over religious freedom? This judicial
predilection appeared during an early spate of first-amendment cases in the 1930s and 1940s,
particularly those involving Jehovah's Witnesses, and continues today. My purpose is to situate
and to explain the early cases in the context of a transformation of democracy—from republican
to pluralist democracy—which occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. Most briefly, republican
democracy emphasized the virtuous pursuit of the common good, while pluralist democracy
emphasizes widespread participation by diverse societal groups.
At the outset, a couple of caveats are in order. First, although I emphasize the relations
between democracy and the first-amendment freedoms, I do not mean to suggest that democracy
alone determined the conceptions of either religious freedom or free expression. Many causal
factors—political, legal, cultural, and otherwise—influenced the developments of both
democracy and the first-amendment freedoms, and my narrative shall draw on these other factors
at appropriate points. Yet, the change in democracy—the movement from republican to pluralist
democracy—provides a lens that fruitfully illuminates key elements of religious freedom, free
expression, and their transformations. Second, while I focus on Supreme Court pronouncements,
especially under pluralist democracy, constitutional meaning does not emanate solely from the
Court. Certainly, if one seeks to understand the meanings of religious freedom and free
expression, the Court is an important institution, but so are Congress, the executive, and other
governmental and non-governmental bodies. Judicial decision making at the level of the
Supreme Court is merely one of many formal and informal mechanisms that generate
constitutional meaning. Thus, my narrative will occasionally discuss non-judicial actors and
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institutions. One cannot understand religious freedom in the nineteenth century, for instance,
without accounting for the de facto Protestantism then prevalent throughout American society.1
With these caveats in place, a thesis emerges: the transition from republican to pluralist
democracy practically turned the first-amendment concepts of free expression and religious
freedom on their heads (if free expression and religious freedom are understood ecumenically, as
not limited to Supreme Court pronouncements).2 Under republican democracy, constitutional
theory and constitutional politics often favored religion over expression, but once pluralist
democracy emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, then theory and politics consistently favored
expression over religion. Free expression became a constitutional “lodestar,”3 while the
protection of religious freedom became episodic.
Constitutional theory, in this Article, means the abstract description, explanation, and
justification of the governmental system, including an account of individual rights and liberties
within that system. Thus, a constitutional theory might, among other things, explain the
operation of democracy, the predominant conceptions of religious freedom and free expression,
and the role of the courts in enforcing rights and liberties. Most constitutional theories contain
both descriptive and prescriptive components. Descriptively, constitutional theories typically
claim to be grounded on actual governmental and societal practices, though most theories do not
account for the totality of such practices. For instance, a theory might assert that all citizens are
equal, but in reality, citizens might be separated by gross disparities of wealth that generate
1

Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (2002) (focusing on ProtestantCatholic relations in nineteenth century).
2

The Supreme Court decided so few first-amendment cases during the nineteenth century
that it would be difficult to support a robust thesis about the Court’s understanding of religious
freedom and free expression during that time period. Cf., Henry J. Abraham, Freedom and the
Court 308-18, 364-76 (5th ed. 1988) (listing the Supreme Court’s free exercise and establishment
clause decisions). When the Court’s decisions, however, are supplemented with evidence from
other sources, including statements from Supreme Court justices outside the judicial context, one
can reach reasonable conclusions regarding the meanings of the first-amendment freedoms
during the era of republican democracy.
3

G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech
In Twentieth-century America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 299, 300-01 (1996).
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inequalities of political power. Prescriptively, then, constitutional theories generally include a
normative mandate so that actual practices, if inconsistent with the theory, should be altered to fit
the theory.4 Constitutional politics, meanwhile, refers to the political preferences or ideologies
that influence the Supreme Court justices’ interpretations of the Constitution, including firstamendment freedoms, and that also shape popular understandings of the Constitution. Political
preferences or ideologies are determined by numerous factors, including cultural values,
economic interests, religious convictions, and so on.5
Part I of this Article explains the transition from republican to pluralist democracy, 6 while
Part II examines how the Court, through a series of cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses,
struggled to explicate pluralist democracy and its implications for judicial review.7 Part II
concludes by underscoring how the justices consistently preferred free expression over religious
freedom in the Witnesses cases.8 Part III focuses on constitutional theory and constitutional
politics: how do theory and politics in a pluralist democratic regime favor expression over
religion?9 Part IV, the conclusion, briefly explores how the Court still today demonstrates a
preference for free expression over religious freedom.10
I. From Republican to Pluralist Democracy

4

For a related description of theory that emphasizes the descriptive and prescriptive
components of most theories, see Stephen M. Feldman, How to Be Critical, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
893, 893-94 (2000).
5

See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the
Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, _ L. & Soc. Inquiry _
(forthcoming) (discussing the relation between politics and legal doctrine in Supreme Court
decision making).
6

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

7

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

8

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

9

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

10

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

Theory and Politics - 5 -

From the time of the constitutional framing through the early twentieth century,
American governments were understood to be republican democracies. 11 The democratic
element of republican democracy arose from popular sovereignty: government supposedly
rested upon the consent of the governed, so sovereignty ultimately and always was grounded on
the people.12 Citizens and governmental officials were supposed to be imbued with civic virtue,
which theoretically led them to pursue the common good rather than “partial or private
interests.”13 Individual rights and liberties were of the utmost importance and were protected
from undue governmental interference, but significantly, such rights and liberties were always
subordinate to the government’s power to act for the common good.14 Put in different words,
any individual right or liberty could be sacrificed for the benefit of the community.15
The components of republican democracy facilitated the exclusion of various societal
groups from the American polity. For example, while the framers of the national Constitution
sought to construct a republican democratic government, they acquiesced in the severe state
governmental restrictions on suffrage. At the time, more than half the population was barred
from voting. Property and wealth qualifications disqualified some white men, while women,
Native Americans, and African-American slaves were typically excluded from voting through
11

Constitution of North Carolina (1776), reprinted in 2 The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the United States 1409, 1409 (Ben
Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter Poore]; Constitution of Pennsylvania (1776),
reprinted in 2 Poore, supra, at 1540, 1540.
12

Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore, supra note 11, at 1908, 1908-09.

13

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 59 (1969)
[hereinafter Wood, Creation]. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for example, stated:
“Government is instituted for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity of the
people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men.”
Constitution of Massachusetts (1780), reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 11, at 956, 958.
14

James Kent explained that “private interest must be made subservient to the general
interest of the community.” James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 276 (1827; Legal
Classics Library Reprint).
15

See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare (1996) (focusing on the antebellum
nineteenth century and how the distinction between the common good and partial and private
interests limited governmental power).
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the Civil War era and afterwards.16 Such exclusions from the polity—from “the people”—were
justified in the name of republican democratic principles: these societal groups were deemed
insufficiently virtuous to understand or to contribute to the common good. Thus, when large
numbers of Roman Catholic immigrants began coming to the United States in the mid-nineteenth
century, Protestant nativists were quick to condemn the immigrants as “unfit for citizenship.”17
Catholics, the nativists charged, lacked the civic virtue necessary for participation in American
republican institutions.18 In the 1830s, Samuel Morse tersely explained: “‘Protestantism favors
Republicanism,’ whereas ‘Popery’ supports ‘Monarchical power.’”19
Regardless of the exclusionary propensities of republican democracy, its basic
parameters—the emphases on popular sovereignty, virtue, and the common good—proved
remarkably resilient, lasting into the early twentieth century. Yet, the specific understandings of
these concepts changed considerably during the nineteenth century. For instance, many framers
believed that virtue was concentrated in an elite segment of American society, while during the
early decades of the nineteenth century, a growing number of Americans began to believe that
virtue was shared equally by all common people (particularly by white Protestant men).20
16

Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the
United States 54-60 (2000); Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals 170-73 (1997); Gordon S. Wood, The
Radicalism of the American Revolution 294 (1991) [hereinafter Wood, Radicalism]. Keyssar
writes: “By 1790, according to most estimates, roughly 60 to 70 percent of adult white men (and
very few others) could vote.” Keyssar, supra, at 24. Gordon Wood notes, however, that at least
some Americans started arguing for universal suffrage during the Revolutionary era. Wood,
Creation, supra note 13, at 182-83. By 1825, all but three states—Rhode Island, Virginia, and
Louisiana—had eliminated property and wealth restrictions. Wood, Radicalism, supra, at 294.
Keyssar reports that during the early nineteenth century, an increasing number of states barred
free African Americans from voting. Keyssar, supra, at 55-57.
17

John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925, at 6
(1992 ed.).
18

Id. (emphasizing how Protestants viewed Catholic traditions as contrary to American
liberty); see Hamburger, supra note 1, at 234-40 (discussing relation between politics and
religion).
19
20

Smith, supra note 16, at 209 (quoting Samuel Morse) (emphasis omitted).

The Republican lawyer and theorist, Tunis Wortman, explained that truth “is not a
courtier whose residence is confined to palaces, nor is it always to be found in the solemn gravity
of a deliberative assembly. [Truth] is to be discovered and ascertained by judgment; and
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Similarly, from the Revolution until the 1820s, political parties were deemed inconsistent with
republican democratic government. Political parties were viewed as factional interest groups
that corruptly pursued private and partial interests rather than the common good. Partly for that
reason, Thomas Jefferson and his supporters truly believed at the end of the eighteenth century
that the energetic Alexander Hamilton sought to lead a political party and to create a national
army for the purpose of overthrowing republican government.21 Yet, by the 1820s and 1830s,
political parties became accepted institutions in republican democracy; they were increasingly
understood to be useful means for engendering political participation by the common man.22
While the nation survived the Civil War, republican democracy was subject to intense
strains during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. These strains appeared in a
variety of realms, including the cultural, social, economic, and intellectual. For instance, during
the antebellum era, science and religion were typically understood to be harmonious, but after
the Civil War, many academic researchers in emergent universities aimed for a type of scientific
objectivity divorced from religious beliefs.23 Before long, a religious backlash crystallized,
emphasizing a new type of fundamentalist Protestantism.24 Meanwhile, industrialization in the
judgment is a faculty possessed in common by mankind.” Tunis Wortman, A Treatise
Concerning Political Enquiry, and the Liberty of the Press 49 (1800; 1970 reprint ed.); see
Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1962) (discussing the development of
an anti-elitism in American society); Smith, supra note 16, at 201 (discussing “anti-elitist
rhetoric” of Jacksonian years).
21

Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 596-617 (1993).

22

Edward Pessen, Jacksonian America 197-232 (rev. ed. 1985); Harry L. Watson, Liberty
and Power 171-74 (1990).
23

George M. Marsden writes that the “collapse of older theologies” led postbellum
researchers to display a “passion for order, systematizing, efficiency, scientific principle, [and]
personal discipline.” George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From
Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief 187 (1994). On the importance of scientific
authoritativeness and objectivity, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity
Question” and the American Historical Profession 16, 31 (1988); Dorothy Ross, The Origins of
American Social Science 62 (1991).
24

Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People 725-27 (1972);
Martin E. Marty, Protestantism in the United States: Righteous Empire 211-12 (2d ed. 1986).
Other helpful books on the history of American Christianity include the following: Jon Butler,
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growing Northeastern and Midwestern cities generated tensions between those geographic areas
and more agrarian regions, produced wealth disparities previously unseen in the United States,
and introduced dangerous and mind-numbing factory jobs as well as bureaucratic corporate
organizations.25 The manufacturers encouraged immigration so they would have an endless
supply of inexpensive laborers, but then massive immigration engendered cultural tensions as
millions of Eastern and Southern Europeans flooded into this country.26 These strains generated
mass political movements such as Populism and Progressivism, which challenged republican
democracy but ultimately left intact the central republican concern for pursuing the common
good.27
The conception of American government as a republican democracy, under siege since
the late nineteenth century, finally crumbled in the 1920s and 1930s. Republican democratic
governments, built on agrarian economics, widespread land-ownership, and Protestant values, no
longer fit the urban, industrial, and culturally diverse America that consolidated between the
World Wars.28 To be sure, old-stock Americans continued to resist urban and immigrant
intrusions. A surging nativist backlash (often with Progressive support) produced Prohibition, a

Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (1990); Nathan O. Hatch, The
Democratization of American Christianity (1989).
25

William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1109, 1218-19 (1989); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 223, 231-33 (1955); William M.
Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886-1937,
at 82-83 (1998).
26

Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance
Movement 23 (1963).
27

Hofstadter, supra note 25, at 259-61; Arthur S. Link & Richard L. McCormick,
Progressivism 54 (1983).
28

See Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940, at 58
(1989) (explaining divisions within American society); William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal 332 (1963) (emphasizing the participation of former political
outsiders in the New Deal coalition); Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression 197-98 (1984)
(discussing changing values in America).
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religious and cultural strike against Catholics.29 Then in 1924, the nativists managed to restrict
immigration severely.30 But with such successes, nativists became complacent, deflated by their
own triumphs, even as other forces further transformed American society and culture. In the
midst of 1920s’ prosperity, manufacturers realized that greater profits lay not in the oppression
of workers but in the conversion of those workers into consumers. With the help of the
burgeoning mass media—movies, radio, and print—a consumer culture took hold. Urban
immigrants, just like other Americans, were welcomed to spend their money on mass-produced,
mass-marketed products.31
Eventually, in the political realm, conceptions of the republican common good that had
long reinforced traditional American Protestant values were called into question. Emblematic of
this change, the Democrats nominated Al Smith, a Catholic New Yorker, as their presidential
candidate in 1928.32 Soon, the Great Depression accelerated the transition in democracy.
Whereas republican democracy had assumed a distinct separation between a private sphere of
economic pursuits and a public sphere of governmental activity—governmental intrusions into
the private sphere were proscribed unless for the common good—demands for governmental

29

Prohibition represented a cultural victory for “the old middle class in American
society.” Gusfield, supra note 26, at 122. Gusfield explains that “[t]he power of the Protestant,
rural native American was greater than that of the Eastern upper classes, the Catholic and Jewish
immigrants, and the urbanized middle class.” Id. at 123.
30

E. P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965, at
187-92 (1981).
31

Gary Cross, An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern
America 20-41 (2000); Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper 56-97 (1995); 2 Who Built
America? Working People and the Nation’s Economy, Politics, Culture and Society 270-87
(Stephen Brier, supervising ed., 1992). During the 1920s, “considerable headway was made—
through advertising, installment purchase plans, a rising living standard, and a new emphasis on
consumerism—toward weaning workers from their traditional values and remolding them into
acquisitive, amoral individualists.” McElvaine, supra note 28, at 202.
32

Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 48-55 (3d ed., revised, 1965). For an
extensive statistical study of the 1928 election, see Allan J. Lichtman, Prejudice and the Old
Politics: The Presidential Election of 1928 (1979).
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intervention in the capitalist marketplace became commonplace in the 1930s.33 Franklin
Roosevelt successfully built his New Deal coalition by responding to these calls for relief from
economic deprivation.34 The coalition strengthened when unskilled immigrant workers,
previously alienated from national politics, metamorphosed into voters, largely through the
avenue of the labor movement. While labor unions had struggled before the 1930s, New Deal
legislation helped unions flourish; unions added members by the millions and, in turn, mobilized
workers as democratic participants (swelling support for the New Deal).35 Massive numbers of
immigrants and their children had now become part of the American polity. 36
The rise of totalitarian governments in Europe during the 1930s helped fortify the
transition to pluralist democracy in the United States. Fascists and Nazis authoritatively dictated
to their populaces, arbitrarily imposed punishments, and suppressed religious, racial, and other
minorities. In opposition, Americans stressed democracy, the rule of law, including
constitutional rights, and the protection of minorities. These supposed components of American
life and government separated us from them. 37 Thus, for instance, in Martin v. City of Struthers,
33

See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 116-19 (1991) (emphasizing the
development of a more activist national government during New Deal).
34

Leuchtenburg, supra note 28, at 331-35. “By 1934, the pattern of the early New Deal
was beginning to emerge. Its distinguishing characteristic was the attempt to redres the
imbalances of the old order by creating a new equilibrium in which a variety of groups and
classes would be represented.” Id. at 84.
35

Badger, supra note 28, at 250; Leuchtenburg, supra note 28, at 147-51, 188-89, 239-41.
Helpful sources on the labor movement during the New Deal include the following: Jerold S.
Auerbach, Labor and Liberty (1966); Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern
America (1994); William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement
(1991); Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the
United States (1991).
36

Badger, supra note 28, at 248-49. “By 1936, Franklin Roosevelt had forged a new
political coalition firmly based on the masses in the great northern cities …. While old-stock
Americans in the small towns clung to the G.O.P., the newer ethnic groups in the cities swung to
Roosevelt, mostly out of gratitude for New Deal welfare measures, but partly out of delight with
being granted ‘recognition.’” Leuchtenburg, supra note 28, at 184.
37

For a contemporary emphasis on the differences between American and totalitarian
governments, see Clarence Dykstra, The Quest for Responsibility, 33 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1
(1939). In 1940, Roosevelt said: “‘The surge of events abroad has made some few doubters
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decided during World War II, the Court struck down the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness under
an ordinance proscribing door-to-door distributions of written materials.38 In reasoning that the
application of this ordinance violated the first amendment, Justice Black’s majority opinion
stressed that “[f]reedom to distribute information … is so clearly vital to the preservation of a
free society that … it must be fully preserved.”39 Justice Murphy’s concurrence, joined by
Justices Douglas and Rutledge, accentuated the difference between American and totalitarian
governments. “Repression has no place in this country. It is our proud achievement to have
demonstrated that unity and strength are best accomplished, not by enforced orthodoxy of views,
but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible measure of freedom of conscience and
thought.”40
By the end of the 1930s, intellectuals were struggling to explain and to justify the new
democracy that had emerged.41 This pluralist democracy was, of course, still based on popular
sovereignty—on the consent of the governed—but now citizens supposedly were to pursue their
private interests. Politics was about building coalitions—interest groups—and jostling for
advantages in the political arena, compromising when necessary to maximize the satisfaction of
one’s interests. While the ultimate goal of republican democracy had been to achieve the
among us ask: Is this the end of a story that has been told? Is the book of democracy now to be
closed and placed away upon the dusty shelves of time?’” Leuchtenburg, supra note 28, at 348.
38

Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

39

Id. at 146-47.

40

Id. at 150 (Murphy, J., concurring). Murphy added: “In these days free men have no
loftier responsibility than the preservation of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that ideal will
not suffer but will prosper in its observance.” Id. at 152; see West Virginia State Board of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (contrasting United States with its “present totalitarian
enemies”).
41

John G. Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory 105, 122-23, 127-45 (1993); Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory 112-14, 138 (1973). For instance, in his
presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Clarence Dykstra declared,
“A paramount question which the world faces is whether responsibility can be achieved and
maintained through the democratic process.” Clarence Dykstra, The Quest for Responsibility, 33
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 22 (1939).
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common good, the ultimate goal of pluralist democracy was to participate—and to win (or at
least to win as much as possible). In theory, all groups and individuals were to participate, to
express their interests and values in the democratic marketplace. None were excluded merely
because of their racial, religious, or ethnic status.42 Indeed, whereas the Supreme Court itself
before the 1930s almost never even mentioned democracy, the justices began to talk incessantly
about democratic participation as they strove to delineate the precise contours of the new
pluralist democratic regime.43
To be sure, the reality of pluralist democracy often did not match the theory. The theory
might demand full and equal democratic participation, but the white Protestant mainstream
nonetheless developed various mechanisms to thwart outsider participation, at least to some
extent, and thus to maintain their own social and cultural dominance. The long struggle, lasting
into the 1960s, to overcome legally protected racial discrimination, as embodied in Jim Crow
laws, provides the most noteworthy example.44 Moreover, those outsiders who managed to
become full participants in the democratic system often did so at a price. In order to participate,
42

For contemporary accounts of (pluralist) democracy, see V.O. Key, Politics, Parties,
and Pressure Groups (4th ed. 1958) (first published in 1942) (emphasizing politics as the
exercise of power, and discussing the role played by pressure groups in that exercise of power);
David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (1951) (extensive study of the functioning and
influence of political interest groups); Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956)
(explaining democratic theory from pluralist perspective). Dahl has explained:
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate
opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final
outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the
agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.
Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics 109 (1989) [hereinafter Dahl, Democracy].
43

See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 56-57 (1993) (discussing emerging importance
of democracy). John Ely, perhaps more than any other legal theorist, elaborated the theoretical
implications of pluralist democracy for judicial review. John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust
(1980).
44

For detailed discussions of the Civil Rights Movement, see David J. Garrow, Bearing
the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (1986);
Robert Weisbrot, Freedom Bound: A History of America’s Civil Rights Movement (1990).
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an individual typically needed to relinquish any strong identification with or markings of their
ethnic or religious backgrounds. For instance, during the 1930s, many Jews managed to land
governmental jobs, but only if they did not appear to be distinctly Jewish, according to dominant
stereotypes.45
The transition to pluralist democracy had numerous important implications for American
society and government.46 For instance, under republican democracy, lobbying was deemed a
corrupt pursuit of partial or private interests contrary to the common good. A legal encyclopedia
neatly summarized the general attitude toward lobbying: “Public policy requires that all
legislators should act solely … with an eye single to the public interest, and the courts
universally hold illegal all contracts for services which involve … the exercise of sinister or
personal influences upon the legislators to secure their votes in favor of a legislative act.”47 Yet
during the 1930s, with the onset of pluralist democracy, lobbying by special interest groups
became an accepted means of political participation.48
Of great significance for the development of first-amendment freedoms, the transition
from republican to pluralist democracy disrupted the institutional practices of judicial review,
particularly in relation to constitutional rights. As a general matter, under republican democracy,
45

Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America
224-32 (1976); Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical
History of the Separation of Church and State 213-14 (1997) [hereinafter Feldman, Please
Don’t]; see Robert A. Burt, Two Jewish Justices: Outcasts in the Promised Land 39 (1988)
(emphasizing how Felix Frankfurter minimized his specifically Jewish background to facilitate
professional success).
46

In legal thought, the post-World War II “legal process” scholars built their
jurisprudential theories on the foundation of pluralist democracy. For a description of the
emergence of legal process, see Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought From
Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage 115-28 (2000) [hereinafter Feldman,
Intellectual Voyage]. For examples of legal process writings, see Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
47

XV The American and English Encyclopaedia of Law 969 (David S. Garland & Lucius
P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1900).
48

Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper 49-51 (1995).
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courts had reviewed governmental actions by determining whether a disputed action was either
for the common good—and therefore permissible—or for partial and private interests—and
therefore impermissible.49 For instance, in an 1829 Tennessee Supreme Court case, Judge John
Catron, who would eventually sit on the United States Supreme Court, explained that “[t]he right
to life, liberty and property, of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule or law that
governs every other member of the body politic.”50 Thus, Catron continued, “every partial or
private law, which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights … is unconstitutional
and void.”51 In 1851, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts elucidated the state police
power by emphasizing that individual rights, including especially the right to own property, must
be subordinated to legislative actions in pursuit of “the common good and general welfare.”52
In short, the basic principles of republican democracy, particularly the distinction
between the common good and partial or private interests, structured the practice of judicial
review. Thus, when pluralist democracy supplanted republican democracy, the structure or
framework for reviewing governmental actions collapsed; the purpose of judicial review blurred.
Under pluralist democracy, the government no longer was required to pursue the common good;
rather, citizens sought to pursue their private interests through various governmental
mechanisms, including legislation. How, then, were courts to review the legitimacy—the
constitutionality—of governmental actions?
In one realm at least, the answer to this conundrum was clear. From 1937 onward, with
pluralist democracy solidifying, courts were to defer to legislative regulations of the economic
marketplace. The courts would, in effect, rubber stamp all reasonable economic regulations
49

Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era
Police Powers Jurisprudence 51-55 (1993). For examples, see State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn.
599 (1831); Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825); Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn.
209, 221 (1822).
50

Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 260 (1829) (Catron, J.).

51

Id.

52

Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 7 Cush. 53, 84-85 (1851).
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rather than questioning whether the action was for the common good.53 But Justice Stone’s
famous footnote four in Carolene Products questioned whether such deference was appropriate
when legislation either infringed liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, including free
expression and religious freedom, restricted participation in democratic processes, or
discriminated against “discrete and insular minorities.”54 Nonetheless, one might reasonably
argue that the Court has never articulated a framework for reviewing governmental actions under
pluralist democracy as theoretically elegant as the one used under republican democracy,
distinguishing the common good from partial or private interests. I do not mean to suggest,
however, that the theoretical elegance of republican democratic judicial review rendered it
simple in application—it was not—nor do I suggest that the Court refrained from exercising its
power of judicial review under pluralist democracy.55 To the contrary, the Court has, in some
contexts, continued to assert its power vigorously, including sometimes in the realm of firstamendment freedoms. Even so, within the pluralist democratic regime, the Court has struggled
to justify its exercise of judicial power and to identify when specific governmental actions
violated constitutional guarantees.
53

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). In cases of economic regulation:

the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
54

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). During
Stone’s earlier career as the Dean of Columbia Law School, he became renowned as a defender
of the free-speech rights of faculty. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United
States 838-39 (Kermit Hall ed., 1992).
55

With regard to the difficulty of resolving cases under republican democratic judicial
review, one need only remember the controversies of the Lochner era. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a
Constitutional Revolution (1998) (discussing the repudiation of Lochner era reasoning from the
perspective of legal doctrine); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn (1995)
(discussing the repudiation of Lochner era reasoning from the perspective of politics).
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II. The Jehovah's Witnesses Cases
The Court decided numerous cases during the 1930s and 1940s involving Jehovah's
Witnesses.56 These cases swirled around the uncertainties of the blossoming pluralist democracy
and its implications for judicial review. The significance of pluralist democracy for firstamendment freedoms, in particular, stood at the center of the Court’s flag-salute cases:
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,57 and West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.58 Gobitis, decided in 1940, arose because the local school board in Minersville,
Pennsylvania, required teachers and students each day to salute the flag and recite the pledge of
allegiance. The Gobitis children, aged twelve and ten, “had been brought up conscientiously to
believe that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of scripture.”59
Since they refused to participate in the daily flag-salute ceremony, the children were expelled.
The Gobitis family argued that this penalty violated the children’s constitutional rights to both
free exercise of religion and free expression.60
The Court rejected both claims and upheld the expulsions. Justice Frankfurter, writing
the majority opinion, reasoned that the best means for maintaining democracy was to nurture a
democratic culture. Democracy must be “ingrained in a people's habits and not enforced against

56

Helpful sources on the Jehovah's Witnesses and their judicial cases include the
following: Peter Irons, The Courage of Their Convictions 13-35 (1988); Eric Michael Mazur,
The Americanization of Religious Minorities: Confronting the Constitutional Order 28-61
(1999); Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah's Witnesses (2000); Vincent Blasi & Seana V.
Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of
Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in Constitutional Law Stories 433 (Michael C. Dorf ed.,
2004); William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law:
Jehovah's Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 997 (1987).
57

310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
58

319 U.S. 624 (1943).

59

Minersville School Dis. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 592 (1940).

60

Gobitis was actually a misspelling of the family’s name. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note
56, at 436 n.15.
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popular policy by the coercion of adjudicated law.”61 The Court therefore should generally defer
to the results of the legislative process—regardless of the substance of those results—“so long as
the remedial channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed.”62 Even if the
legislature had impinged on first-amendment freedoms, unless the justices identified some defect
in the democratic process, the Court was to defer to the legislative judgment.63 Indeed, from
Frankfurter’s viewpoint, the Court’s deference to democracy was likely to generate exactly those
types of political debates that would propagate democratic culture.64
Justice Stone’s Gobitis dissent articulated a different relationship between pluralist
democracy and first-amendment freedoms. Stone initially noted that the suppression of minority
rights should no longer be justified by reference to the republican democratic common good.
“History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of personal liberty by the state
which have not been justified, as they are here, in the name of … the public good, and few which
have not been directed, as they are now, at politically helpless minorities.”65 But, of course,
Frankfurter had not relied on republican democracy to reject the constitutional claims; to the
contrary, Frankfurter had elaborated the scope of judicial review under pluralist democracy.

61

Minersville School Dis. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940), overruled, West Virginia
State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
62

Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599.

63

See Ely, supra note 43, at 73-104 (explaining the Court's role in policing the democratic

process).
64

Frankfurter wrote:

Where all the effective means of inducing political changes are left free from
interference, education in the abandonment of foolish legislation is itself a training in
liberty. To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion
and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial
arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free people.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
65

Id. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Thus, Stone proceeded to critique the democracy-reinforcing argument of Frankfurter.66 In
particular, Stone criticized Frankfurter’s assertion that the Court should defer to “the legislative
judgment ‘as long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain open and
unobstructed.’”67 Stone, to be clear, did not object to the Court refusing to defer when the
democratic process is obstructed, but he believed that the Court must do more to police
democracy.68 Citing his Carolene Products footnote four, Stone added that “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may tend to curtail the operation of [democratic processes]” and
thus should spur “a searching judicial inquiry into the legislative judgment.”69 To reinforce this
conclusion, Stone reasoned that “freedom of mind and spirit,” which would encompass free
expression and religious freedom, is prerequisite to democracy itself.70 So, according to Stone,
“free government” was the goal, but preservation of the first-amendment freedoms was integral
to achieving that goal.71
Spurred partly by the Court's Gobitis decision and partly by fears of impending war,
school boards across the nation quickly imposed flag-salute requirements.72 More significant,
innumerable vigilante attacks were unleashed against Jehovah's Witnesses in retribution for their
supposed disloyalty, as evidenced by their refusal to salute the flag.73 The Court announced the
Gobitis decision on June 3, 1940, and by June 20, the Department of Justice already had reports

66

When John Ely articulated his constitutional theory grounded on pluralist democracy,
he called it “representation-reinforcement.” Ely, supra note 43, at 101-02, 181.
67

Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 605-06 (Stone, J., dissenting).

68

Ely identified the Court's role as “policing” the democratic or representative processes.
Ely, supra note 43, at 102.
69

Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting).

70

Id. at 606.

71

Id.

72

McAninch, supra note 56, at 1019.

73

Peters, supra note 56, at 72-95; McAninch, supra note 56, at 1018-21.
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of literally hundreds of such attacks.74 Perhaps in response to these events, the Court soon
reconsidered the flag-salute issue.
In another case involving Jehovah's Witnesses, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the Court overruled Gobitis and held that a compulsory flag-salute violated the first
amendment.75 The Barnette opinions again revolved around the meaning of pluralist democracy
and its implications for free expression and religious freedom. Justice Jackson’s majority
opinion asserted that the point of the first amendment was to categorically withdraw free
expression and religious freedom from the vagaries of pluralist democracy.76 Because pluralist
democracy is grounded on consent of the governed, the Bill of Rights precludes the government
from coercing such consent.77 Free government cannot exist without first-amendment freedoms.
This time Frankfurter found himself in dissent. He reiterated that his primary concern
was to promote democracy: “The reason why from the beginning even the narrow judicial
authority to nullify legislation has been viewed with a jealous eye is that it serves to prevent the
full play of the democratic process.”78 And once again, he stressed the need to promote
74

McAninch, supra note 56, at 1019 & n.147.

75

West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Justice Jackson’s
draft majority opinion referred to the vigilante attacks against Jehovah's Witnesses, but Justice
Stone convinced him to delete such references because they suggested that the Court was
overruling Gobitis for political reasons. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 451.
76

Jackson wrote:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
77

Jackson wrote: “We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of
Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be
controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.” Id. at 641.
78

Id. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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democratic culture as the best means for preserving democracy. The judicial enforcement of
individual rights was likely, in the end, to undermine democracy.
Particularly in legislation affecting freedom of thought and freedom of speech much
which should offend a free-spirited society is constitutional. Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found outside of their vindication in
courts of law. Only a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into the
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate reliance against
unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit.79
During these early years of uncertainty, with the justices debating the contours of
pluralist democracy and the parameters of judicial review, the Court in effect experimented with
different approaches for resolving concrete first-amendment disputes. For a brief period, the
Court reasoned that certain constitutional rights, including free expression and religious freedom,
were preferred freedoms.80 As such, the justices explained, these rights deserved special judicial
protection. In many cases, though, the Court treated constitutional rights as values or interests
that were to be balanced against other interests, particularly governmental interests, within the
pluralist democratic regime.81 “Decision as to the lawfulness of the conviction demands the

79

Id. at 670-71.

80

For instance, in 1943, the Court stated that “[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech,
freedom of religion are in a preferred position.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115
(1943); see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (using preferred freedoms
language); Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power
and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 Pol. Res. Q. 623, 640-45 (1994)
(discussing the rise of the preferred freedoms approach). Previously, Chief Justice Stone had
written in dissent: “The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and
freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary the
Constitution, by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a
preferred position.” Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the demise of the preferred freedoms terminology, see G. Edward White, The
Constitution and the New Deal 149-52 (2000).
81

E.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943); see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943 (1987) (exploring and
criticizing the emergence of the balancing test in constitutional law).
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weighing of two conflicting interests,” the Court reasoned in Cantwell v. Connecticut.82 “The
fundamental law declares the interest of the United States that the free exercise of religion be not
prohibited and that freedom to communicate information and opinion be not abridged.”83 But,
the Court immediately added, “The state of Connecticut has an obvious interest in the
preservation and protection of peace and good order within her borders.”84 Despite such
language, suggesting an evenhanded weighing of interests, the Court would sometimes skew the
balance against the government, especially if the invoked constitutional right was either free
expression, religious freedom, or both.85 The justices themselves acknowledged their struggles
to harmonize the judicial protection of constitutional rights with pluralist democracy. Writing in
Barnette, Justice Jackson understatedly lamented: “[T]he task of translating the majestic
generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth
century, is one to disturb self-confidence.”86
Significantly, while the Court's opinions often linked free expression and religious
freedom—for instance, in the preferred freedoms cases—the Court consistently showed greater
solicitude for free-expression than free-exercise claims. This judicial favoring of expression
over religion emerged most clearly in several of the Jehovah's Witnesses cases. Members of the
Witnesses often sought to fulfill their religious obligations by disseminating information
regarding religion through some inexpensive means, such as the distribution of leaflets or books
82

310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939) (striking down convictions for
distributing handbills by applying balancing test that favored free expression). In some of these
cases, especially in the realm of free exercise, the Court would reason that the governmental
action could be upheld only if it was necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest or
purpose. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
86

West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
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on street corners or door-to-door. Such individuals were convicted for numerous criminal
violations including breach of the peace and refusing to pay a license fee.87 Because of the
nature of their actions, these defendants would argue that both free expression and free exercise
shielded their actions from governmental punishment. The Court, however, consistently refused
to uphold the free-exercise claims in isolation. The Court would, on the one hand, find the
defendant’s actions unprotected or would, on the other hand, find the actions protected because
of either free expression alone or a combination of free expression and religious freedom.88
Without the support of free expression, a religious freedom claim inevitably failed.89
87

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
88

See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down conviction by
relying solely on free expression); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (refusing
to recognize the religious character of the defendant’s action and then rejecting the free speech
claim because of fighting words doctrine). Mazur explains:
Most of the decisions rendered by the justices rely on the role and significance of the
First Amendment right to free speech alongside—but just as often rather than—the other
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. From the beginning, the religious free
exercise argument was less persuasive than the free speech argument. All of the cases
denied a full hearing by the Court from 1937 to 1940 relied solely on religious free
exercise grounds, whereas three of the five that received a full hearing during that same
period and that relied in part or wholly on free speech arguments were decided in favor of
the Witnesses.
Mazur, supra note 56, at 50 (emphasis in original).
89

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), is one case that might be interpreted as
relying solely on free exercise, at least to strike down a conviction on one of the (information)
counts. At one point, the Court writes:
The state is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation
of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of
which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious
cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the
Constitution.
Id. at 306-07. But throughout the opinion, and indeed in the quoted passage, the discussion of
religious freedom is consistently intermingled with references to free expression. While unclear,
I tend to agree with Mazur’s conclusion that the Court’s decision “took special note of the free
speech arguments offered by the Witnesses, affirming their plausibility as significant in the
decision.” Mazur, supra note 56, at 50.
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The justices demonstrated the distinct judicial treatment of free-expression and religiousfreedom claims in the two flag-salute cases.90 In Gobitis, Frankfurter’s majority opinion began
by focusing on religious freedom: “We must decide whether the requirement of participation in
such a ceremony, exacted from a child who refuses upon sincere religious grounds, infringes
without due process of law the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”91 Indeed,
referring to free exercise as a “precious right,”92 Frankfurter articulated a seemingly broad vision
of religious freedom:
Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one's convictions about the ultimate mystery of the
universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the reach of law. Government may not
interfere with organized or individual expression of belief or disbelief. Propagation of
belief—or even of disbelief in the supernatural—is protected, whether in church or
chapel, mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meetinghouse. Likewise the Constitution
assures generous immunity to the individual from imposition of penalties for offending,
in the course of his own religious activities, the religious views of others, be they a
minority or those who are dominant in government.93
Nonetheless, Frankfurter immediately qualified the individual right to religious freedom
by reasoning that it must be tempered by a recognition of societal interests.94 Most important,
Frankfurter explained, the right to free exercise does not relieve the individual from obeying
laws of general applicability. “The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the
relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political
90

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
91

Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 592-93.

92

Id. at 593.

93

Id.

94

“But the manifold character of man's relations may bring his conception of religious
duty into conflict with the secular interests of his fellow-men.” Id.
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responsibilities.”95 In this case, then, the Court concluded that the Gobitis children, despite their
religious convictions, should not be relieved from their obligation to participate in the flag-salute
ceremonies. Thus, only after emphasizing but ultimately rejecting the free exercise claim did
Frankfurter turn to free speech. He quickly disposed of this claim by reasoning that a societal
interest in national unity outweighed the interest in free expression.96 The daily flag ceremonies,
the School Board had decided, instilled in the school children the desired commitment to
national unity.
When the Court reconsidered the flag-salute issue in Barnette, the Witnesses’ attorney,
like the attorneys in Gobitis, stressed religious freedom. Regardless, Justice Jackson’s majority
opinion in Barnette relied almost exclusively on free expression.97 Jackson mentioned the clear
and present danger test and, somewhat obscurely, a balancing approach as relevant to freespeech issues,98 but in the end, he apparently interpreted the first-amendment protection of free
95

Id. at 594-95.

96

Id. at 595.

97

Brief for Appellees, West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(1942 Term, No. 591), reprinted in 40 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Constitutional Law 39, 65-137 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975); Brief for Respondents, Minersville School Dis. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (1939
Term, No. 690), reprinted in 37 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Constitutional Law 367, 381-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975); Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 437-38. Jackson reasoned:
Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious views or
the sincerity with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees’ motive for
enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share
these religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the
individual. It is not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt
from the duty to salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35.
98

Jackson explicitly refers to the clear and present danger test. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
The reference to balancing is ambiguous:
The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The State asserts
power to condition access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profession
and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child. The latter
stand on a right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and
personal attitude.
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expression as being absolute, at least in the circumstances of that case. “[N]o official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”99
To the Barnette Court, the flag salute was undoubtedly “a form of utterance.”100
Moreover, not only was the flag salute a type of expression, it was political expression. The
government used the flag ceremony precisely “as a symbol of adherence to government as
presently organized. It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance
of the political ideas it thus bespeaks.”101 But in the United States, Jackson emphasized,
government was by the consent of the people—a consent that the government itself could not
coerce.102 Poignantly underscoring this point about the relation between the government and
political speech, the Court alluded to contemporary world events: “Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”103
So, the Barnette Court overruled Gobitis and held that a compulsory flag salute violated
freedom of expression. But why did the Gobitis Court stress religious freedom when it rejected
the first-amendment claims, while the Barnette Court almost exclusively focused on free
expression when it repudiated forced flag salutes? More generally, why did the justices
consistently favor free-expression over religious-freedom claims?
Id. at 630-31.
99

Id. at 642; see Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 29 (1970)
(discussing the different tests invoked in Jackson’s opinion).
100

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.

101

Id. at 633.

102

“We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those
in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.” Id. at 641.
103

Id.
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III. Favoring Free Expression Over Religious Freedom
A. Constitutional Theory
If anything, republican democracy seemed to favor religion (read: Protestantism) over
expression. As a general matter, courts would review governmental actions within the regime of
republican democracy to determine whether the actions were for the common good or for partial
and private interests. Because individual rights and liberties were generally subordinate to the
common good, it followed that the government possessed the power to punish speech or writing
if such punishment would further the common good.104 And criminal punishment would
presumably be for the common good if the speech or writing had a bad tendency or likely
pernicious consequences. This theoretical justification for a narrow concept of free expression
elucidates the legal doctrine that prevailed in most states through the nineteenth century. Free
speech and a free press were deemed crucial rights or liberties, yet individuals were responsible
for their abuses. Thus, in the context of criminal or seditious libel prosecutions, the concern for
the common good engendered the truth-conditional doctrine, first articulated by Judge James
Kent in People v. Croswell. 105 Under this approach, truth was a defense to a charge of criminal
libel but only if the defendant published for good motives and justifiable ends. If the published
material was either false, or true but with bad tendencies, then it was criminally punishable.106
Given this theory and doctrine, courts generally were unprotective of free expression under
republican democracy.
In the realm of religion, however, the government—including the courts—tended to be
supportive. More precisely, the government (the state and national governments, that is)
104

James Wilson was one of the first constitutional theorists to justify the suppression of
speech and writing because of the principles of republican democracy. James Wilson, II The
Works of James Wilson 279-80, 287, 313, 393-97 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1895 ed.).
105
106

People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).

For examples of free-expression cases where the courts used the truth-conditional or
bad tendency terminology, see Moody v. State, 94 Ala. 42 (1892); People v. Most, 128 N.Y. 108
(1891); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. 176 (1811); Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163
(1808).
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nurtured mainstream Protestantism but not other religions.107 In republican democratic terms,
Protestantism supposedly imbued citizens with virtue and shaped their understanding of the
common good. As George Washington declared in his Farewell Address, “religion and morality
are indispensable supports … . of the duties of men and citizens.”108 Thus, throughout the
nineteenth century, leading jurists, such as Joseph Story and James Kent, deemed Christianity to
be part of the common law.109 Story, a Harvard law professor as well as a Supreme Court
justice, considered himself a strong advocate for religious liberty.110 Regardless, in 1833, Story
declared that “it is impossible for those, who believe in the truth of Christianity, as a divine
revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of government to foster, and encourage it among
all the citizens and subjects.”111 Even after the Civil War, when many jurisprudents turned to a
107

The first-amendment religion clauses initially were, in a sense, jurisdictional: the
national government would leave issues of religion to the state and local governments. The
national government, in other words, would not interfere with freedom of conscience, and
official establishments would arise, if at all, only from sundry choices made at the local or state
level–not at the national level. Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 45, at 164-67; Leonard W.
Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment 66-67, 83-84, 108-09
(1986) [hereinafter Levy, Establishment Clause]. Given that the state governments (as well as
the national government) were conceptualized as republican democracies, the theoretical relation
between religion and government therefore emerged most clearly at the state level.
108

Washington’s Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in I Documents of
American History 169, 173 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 9th ed. 1973).
109

Morton Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels 31, 98-103 (1984); Naomi W. Cohen, Jews
in Christian America: The Pursuit of Religious Equality 55-56 (1992); Frederic Cople Jaher, A
Scapegoat in the New Wilderness: The Origins and Rise of Anti-Semitism in America 139
(1994); cf. Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America 195-96 (1965) (acknowledging that
some jurists denied that Christianity was part of the common law); Stuart Banner, When
Christianity was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 27 (1998) (questioning the
significance of nineteenth-century declarations that Christianity was part of the common law);
B.H. Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non-Believers in the
United States, 39 Yale L.J. 659 (1930) (tracing the notion that Christianity is part of the common
law to Lord Coke).
110

For a summary of Story’s broader jurisprudential views, see Feldman, Intellectual
Voyage, supra note 46, at 81-82; Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American
Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1414-17 (1997).
111

Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 723 (1991;
originally published in 1833). David Hoffman, professor of law at the University of Maryland,
wrote: “The purity and sublimity of the morals of the Bible have at no time been questioned; it
is the foundation of the common law of every christian nation. The christian religion is a part of
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more positivist than natural law orientation, Thomas Cooley explained: “[We are not precluded]
from recognizing … in the rules prescribed for the conduct of citizens, the patent fact that the
prevailing religion in the States is Christian.”112 Unsurprisingly, then, numerous states enforced
the Christian Sabbath of Sunday as common-law doctrine (and some states enacted Blue
Laws).113 As late as the beginning of the twentieth century, police arrested tens of thousands of
Jews for violating such laws.114 Moreover, religious minorities, especially Jews, Catholics, and
Mormons, lived in many states with the threat that overt repudiation of mainstream Protestantism
might provoke a prosecution for blasphemy. A Delaware court, upholding a blasphemy
conviction in 1837, explained that it had “been long perfectly settled by the common law, that
blasphemy against the Deity in general, or a malicious and wanton attack against the christian
religion individually, for the purpose of exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is
indictable and punishable.”115
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With the transition from republican to pluralist democracy in the 1920s and 1930s,
however, this favoring of (Protestant) religion over expression was reversed. In the first
“explicit” free speech win in the Supreme Court,116 decided in 1931, the Court expressly
grounded the protection of expression on the operation of democracy: “The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”117 From this
point forward, the Court not only became more protective of free expression but also elaborated
a theoretical rationale for broad protection based on pluralist democracy.
In 1937, the Court reiterated “the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of
free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.”118 The
protection of free expression was “imperative” because it provided “the very foundation of
constitutional government.”119 Pluralist democracy, as the justices elaborated it, accepted
diversity rather than attempting to suppress it within the confines of a culturally homogeneous
common good. Free expression, therefore, did not need to be constrained to preserve “the
existing order;”120 the justices had “no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization.”121 By the 1940s, the Court
was emphasizing that “[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on
116
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free discussion,”122 and that a strong conception of free expression was consequently a “fixed
star in our constitutional constellation.”123
In sum, if the hallmark of pluralist democracy is, as the Court reasoned, the full and open
participation by diverse individuals and groups in governmental processes, then free expression
must be expansively protected. Political participation cannot be open to and fair for all citizens
unless each individual is theoretically able to express his or her interests and values in the
democratic marketplace. Such freedom of expression, it might be said, is prerequisite to the
operation of pluralist democracy. Not coincidentally, in 1948, Alexander Meiklejohn
definitively articulated the self-governance rationale—the theoretical grounding of free
expression on pluralist democracy.124 “The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the
necessities of the program of self-government,” Meiklejohn wrote.125 “It is a deduction from the
basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.”126 And
most constitutional scholars still maintain that the demands of democratic self-governance
require an expansive core of protected political speech and writing and that free expression is
therefore a constitutional “lodestar.”127 One scholar, for instance, recently proclaimed that “[t]he
heart of a free society is the right—and in fact the duty—of the citizens to discuss politics and to
criticize the government.”128
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The theoretical ties between religious freedom and pluralist democracy have never been
so distinct or compelling. While many agree that free expression is integral to democracy—a
right “essential to the democratic process,”129 in Robert Dahl’s words—many would insist that
the same is not true of religious freedom. Indeed, one might reasonably argue that deep religious
convictions are in tension with a pluralist democratic regime. Pluralist democracy assumes that
citizens bring diverse preexisting interests and values to the democratic arena, that citizens jostle
for advantage and try to win the democratic contests, and that—and here is the problem—
citizens compromise when necessary.130 Under pluralist democracy, in other words, citizens are
theorized to have preexisting interests and values, and those interests and values might be
strongly held and pursued, but citizens always must be capable of accommodating the interests
and values of others.131 Yet, some religious beliefs are not merely strong, they are convictions—
beliefs imbued with certitude, excluding doubt. For some individuals, such religious convictions
cannot be accommodated to other interests and values in the democratic arena. One does not
compromise, for instance, an absolute truth derived from God’s will. One does not compromise,
for instance, one’s pursuit of eternal salvation. Religious beliefs, from this standpoint, are not
readily harmonized with the processes of pluralist democracy. Partly for this reason, some
theorists have argued that religious beliefs should not be relied upon in political debates or, that
is, in the so-called public square. From this perspective, secular reasons should be offered in any
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public debate because religious convictions are likely to inhibit the free and open discussion and
negotiation that pluralist democracy demands.132
Nonetheless, some theorists have argued that religious freedom should still be protected
as fully as free expression in a pluralist democracy. For instance, one might argue that religious
beliefs are so central to the American people that any position that banishes religion from the
public sphere inevitably blinks reality.133 For deeply religious Americans, secular reasons cannot
possibly substitute for religious convictions; for these Americans, religious beliefs constitute the
core of their beings, their identities. Or, in the alternative, one might theorize that religious
freedom—at least for religious minorities—should be vigorously protected because, in the words
of Justice Stone’s footnote four, discrimination against “discrete and insular minorities” should
be impermissible in a pluralist democratic regime.134 Purposeful discrimination against a
discrete and insular (religious) minority manifests a defect in the democratic process itself.135
Or, yet again, one might theorize that the constitutional protection of religious freedom
proscribes the exclusion or diminished participation of religious groups qua religious groups
within the American polity.136
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In any event, while some theorists might be persuaded by any one of these arguments (or,
for that matter, by some other argument or combination of arguments), no single theoretical
justification for the broad protection of religious freedom enjoys the near-universal support that
is accorded to the self-governance rationale for free expression.137 To be sure, many free-speech
theorists offer additional rationales for protecting expression, but most agree that, at a minimum,
political expression must be protected because it is integral to pluralist democracy.138 Many
would agree that, without free expression, “the democratic process does not exist,”139 but a
similar assertion for religious freedom would likely provoke widespread dissent. In short, the
importance of free expression to a pluralist democratic regime is readily apparent, but the same is
not true of religious freedom.
B. Constitutional Politics
Theory is one thing, but its application is another. Whatever theoretical outlooks the
various justices held, they implemented those theories from within their respective political
horizons (moreover, the justices’ political views undoubtedly contributed to their theoretical
preferences in the first place).140
Under republican democracy, the predominant legal doctrine for determining the scope of
free expression was the Croswell truth-conditional standard. Published material was criminally
punishable if it was either false, or true but with bad tendencies.141 In those instances when an
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individual was being prosecuted, courts consistently deemed that the defendant’s expression was
unprotected as either false or likely to produce a bad tendency. After all, the mere fact that the
defendant was being prosecuted demonstrated that at least some governmental actors believed
the speech to be harmful or bad. For instance, in an 1879 federal prosecution for mailing
obscene materials, the court approved a definition of obscenity based on bad tendencies.
Material was deemed obscene “if it would have a tendency to suggest impure and libidinous
thoughts in the minds of those open to the influence of such thoughts, and thus deprave and
corrupt their morals, if they should read such matter.”142 In an 1891 New York prosecution,
People v. Most, the State convicted the defendant under an unlawful assembly statute for making
a threat in concert with two other persons.143 In the context of a volatile political situation and in
front of a sympathetic audience, Most had “denounced the murderers of … ‘friends and
comrades,’ and threatened revenge.”144 In upholding the conviction, the court reasoned that the
government could protect against expression with a bad tendency. “Nor is it … an answer to the
indictment that the threats related to acts not presently to be done, but to be performed at some
future time, when affairs were ripe for the revolution predicted,” the court explained.145 “The
main purpose of the common law and of the statute relating to unlawful assemblies, is the
protection of the public peace.”146 Unsurprisingly, in the Supreme Court’s first twentiethcentury free-expression cases, the justices generally approved the bad tendency approach as
well.147
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Politics influenced free expression in another manner, outside of the courts’ judicial
interpretations of legal doctrine. In particular, the bad tendency standard coexisted with two
competing traditions: a tradition of dissent and a tradition of suppression. Both these traditions
not only had roots reaching back before the American Revolution to colonial times, but both
traditions also had been repeatedly manifested through official and unofficial channels. During
the Revolutionary era, for instance, American Patriots consistently declared the importance of
dissent in opposition to British rule and law. “There is nothing so fretting and vexatious; nothing
so justly terrible to tyrants, and their tools and abettors, as a free press,” proclaimed Samuel
Adams in the Boston Gazette.148 Yet, those same American Patriots were quick to suppress the
views of British Loyalists or Tories, who were scared into silence, driven out of town, or tarred
and feathered.149 Significantly, the tradition of suppression as well as the narrow nineteenthcentury legal definition of free expression fit closely with the exclusionary component of
republican democracy, which supposedly justified the denial of individual rights to large groups
of the population, such as women and African Americans. The suppression of speech and
writing, for individuals in these groups, was merely one aspect of their diminished liberty and
participation in the polity.
During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, many disputes involving free
expression were centered in forums other than the courts. Invocations of the traditions of dissent
and suppression were consequently more important than citations to legal authorities and
doctrine. In these years, the competing traditions repeatedly clashed within the crucible of
slavery and abolition. Slavery was the political issue that drove nineteenth-century actors, that
forced one confrontation after another, until the final confrontation of the Civil War.150 Hence,
148
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while Americans cared about free expression, through most of these antebellum conflicts free
expression was a rhetorical tool to be used for political advantage. For example, in the mid1830s, the American Anti-Slavery Society initiated a petition drive, flooding Congress with
petitions signed by thousands of abolitionists. In effect, the abolitionists sought to invoke the
tradition of dissent, of speaking one’s mind, through the right of petition. Slaveholders, though,
were quick to seek suppression; Southern congressional leaders managed to impose a gag-rule in
the House that barred the presentation of abolitionist petitions.151
Turning to religion under republican democracy, the last official state church
establishment ended in 1833,152 but most Americans continued to understand religious freedom
from a largely Protestant vantage. In 1853, clergyman and professor Bela Bates Edwards
epitomized this viewpoint: “Perfect religious liberty does not imply that government of the
country is not a Christian government.”153 Alexis de Tocqueville had observed that “[i]n the
United States, Christianity itself is an established and irresistible fact.”154 James Bryce, in 1888,
likewise discerned that “Christianity is in fact understood to be, though not the legally
established religion, yet the national religion.”155 Unsurprisingly, then, many states explicitly
151
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limited the civil rights of non-Christians, often long after the state-established churches had been
eliminated. In the early 1800s, for example, Jews could practice law in only four states,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and New York.156 Numerous states, through much of
the nineteenth century, restricted public office holding so as to favor Protestants in particular or
Christians in general.157
For approximately the first 150 years of the nation’s existence, the Supreme Court
infrequently decided cases related to religion, whether under the free exercise clause,
establishment clause, or otherwise. When the occasional case involving religion reached the
Court, the justices’ legal pronouncements typically manifested the Protestant nature of American
culture and society.158 In 1844, for instance, the Court decided Vidal v. Girard’s Executors.159
156
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Girard had bequeathed his sizable estate for the purpose of creating a school for orphans and
impoverished scholars. Girard’s will, however, included the following limitation: “[N]o
ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any
station or duty whatever in the said college; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any
purpose . . . within the premises . . . of the said college.”160 The will was challenged as being
hostile to Christianity and therefore contrary to the common law of Pennsylvania, where Girard
had resided. In upholding the validity of the will, the Court acknowledged that “Christianity [is]
a part of the common law of the state [of Pennsylvania in the sense] that its divine origin and
truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed
against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public.”161 The Court did not see any
tension between, on the one hand, having the state common law encompass Christianity and, on
the other hand, having a state constitution that included disestablishment and free exercise
clauses. As if to underscore even further how the hegemonic Protestant culture shaped the
American understanding of religious freedom, the Court turned to an additional, though
hypothetical, issue: whether a devise “for the propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or any other
form of infidelity” would contravene the common law.162 In refusing to decide this issue, since it
was not raised by the facts, the Court nonetheless suggested that such a devise might impugn or
repudiate Christianity and thus might be unenforceable.163 Moreover, the Court added that
“[s]uch a case is not to be presumed to exist in a Christian country.”164
When the Court considered the rare religion case challenging federal activity, most often
brought under the free exercise clause, the justices upheld the governmental action as
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constitutional. Put in different words, the beliefs and practices of religious outsiders were
inevitably found subordinate to the common good of the mainstream Protestant polity. In
Reynolds v. United States, decided in 1878, Reynolds challenged his criminal conviction for
committing polygamy in a federal territory.165 A Mormon, Reynolds contended that he was
religiously obligated to follow polygamy and that the conviction therefore violated the free
exercise clause. The Court not only rejected the first amendment claim and upheld Reynolds’s
conviction, but in doing so, the Court also closely followed Protestant doctrine. Protestant
denominations generally stress that salvation turns solely on faith or belief in Christ and is
unrelated to this-worldly conduct or action. Predictably, then, the Court too emphasized a
distinction between beliefs and actions. According to the Court, Congress could not
constitutionally pass laws that would infringe on religious beliefs and opinions–since such laws
would interfere with Protestant salvation–but for the good of society, Congress could restrict
actions, even if those actions were supposedly related to religious beliefs.166
Nearly fifteen years later, the justices considered a federal statute that proscribed entering
contracts with aliens to encourage their immigration.167 Despite this statutory prohibition, a
church had contracted for an English citizen to come to America as the church’s rector and
pastor. In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, the Court held that the federal statute did
not prohibit this particular contract because the Congress of the United States, a Christian nation,
could not have intended to prohibit contracting with Christian ministers. After all, the Court
reasoned, “this is a Christian nation.”168 Congressional intent was to prohibit the importation of
165
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cheap and unskilled laborers–many of whom were non-Christians–because they were disrupting
the American labor market.169 The Court concluded with an incredulous rhetorical question:
“[S]hall it be believed that a congress of the United States intended to make it a misdemeanor for
a church of this country to contract for the services of a Christian minister residing in another
nation?”170
Just as with free expression, of course, politics also shaped religious freedom outside of
judicial contexts and legal pronouncements. Non-Protestants typically enjoyed far more liberty
in the United States than they had in their homelands. In this sense, there was a popular tradition
of religious dissent. Jews, for instance, left Eastern Europe in droves partly because they faced
government-sponsored pogroms in their countries of origin.171 In this nation, they rarely had to
endure overt governmental suppression or violence. This tradition of dissent, though, was
perhaps most evident within Protestantism itself. Because of the lack of state-sponsored
churches, Protestants readily switched from one church to another and, with amazing frequency,
especially during the Second Great Awakening of the nineteenth century, created new Protestant
sects and denominations.172
But this tradition of dissent was counterbalanced by a vigorous tradition of suppression.
During the early nineteenth century, for instance, the most prominent American Jew was
Mordecai Noah, the American consul to Tunis from 1813 to 1815. Newspapers belittled Noah
by referring to him with antisemitic epithets like “Hooked Nose” and “Shylock.”173 Eventually,
the Secretary of State, James Monroe, dismissed Noah from his post because “the Religion
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which you profess [is] an obstacle to the exercise of your consular functions.”174 The tradition of
suppression was manifested more violently in the case of the Mormons. Joseph Smith, Jr.,
founded the Mormon movement in upstate New York in the midst of the Second Great
Awakening. In the Book of Mormon, which Smith wrote, he incorporated the history of
European colonization of America into Christian eschatology; Mormonism, that is, was to
supplant mainstream Christianity, just as early Christianity had been intended to supplant
Judaism (according to the New Testament).175 Given such religious views, many Americans
feared that Mormonism threatened the predominant forms of Protestantism as well as republican
democracy.176 Persecution of the Mormons, unsurprisingly, was common and often violent,
forcing Smith’s followers to move from state to state as they sought refuge. From New York,
Smith went to Ohio, where he was eventually dragged from his house to be tarred and feathered.
Smith moved on to Jackson County, Missouri, where mob violence again forced him to flee, this
time to northern Missouri. Further violence led the Mormons next to Illinois, where Smith was
arrested, then in June 1844, murdered while he was awaiting trial.177 Finally, Smith’s successor,
Brigham Young, led the community to the Great Salt Lake area, where they established the
autonomous State of Deseret, only to become embroiled with the federal government in legal
struggles that would stretch on for decades.178
The force of politics on the conceptions of free expression and religious freedom changed
with the transition from republican to pluralist democracy. The republican democratic principles
of civic virtue and the common good had long facilitated the exclusion of various societal groups
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from fully participating in the American polity. Groups, such as immigrant laborers, were either
excluded or discouraged from participating supposedly because they lacked the virtue necessary
to understand or contribute to the common good—a concept that typically embodied the interests
and values of old-stock Americans, particularly Protestant elites.179 Given this exclusionary
aspect of republican democracy, the denial or suppression of specific individual rights, such as
religious freedom, was often only part of a societal group’s more comprehensive political
subjugation. The courts, from this perspective, merely reinforced the exclusionary tendencies of
republican democracy. But the transition from republican to pluralist democracy undermined the
traditional justifications for oppressing societal outsiders or, to use Ran Hirschl’s term,
“peripheral groups.”180 After all, the crux of pluralist democracy was participation: all groups
and individuals, in theory, were to participate, to express their interests and values in the
democratic marketplace. One did not need to demonstrate democratic worthiness by endorsing
Protestant-tinged conceptions of virtue and the common good.
One reason, of course, for the emergence of pluralist democracy was the actual
expanding political power within the American polity of outsider or peripheral groups, such as
Irish Catholics, Eastern European Jews, and laborers in general—a burgeoning power that
undergirded the New Deal. The flowering of this outsider political power, within the framework
179

I do not mean to suggest that Protestant elites always consciously sought to link the
common good to their own interests and values. To the contrary, these elites might have
sincerely believed that they had correctly specified the common good, but of course, their
perceptions of the common good were tacitly shaped by their own interests and values. In other
words, the common good might correspond with the Protestant elite’s interests and values
regardless of whether the elite consciously sought this correspondence. For an example of this
type of phenomenon, see Linda Gordon’s description of a 1904 adoption dispute in a small
Arizona mining town. The white citizens genuinely believed that they acted for the common
good when they prevented Mexican-American families from adopting white children (Irish
Catholic New Yorkers). Yet, these citizens clearly acted in a manner conducive to their own
interests and values; many of the citizen-protest leaders eventually adopted the children
themselves. Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction 159-60 (1999).
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Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins Of Judicial Empowerment Through
Constitutionalization: Lessons From Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry
91, 95-96 (2000) [Hirschl, Political Origins]; Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideway, Looking
Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Review vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34
U. Rich. L. Rev. 415, 432 (2000) [hereinafter Hirschl, Looking].
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of the pluralist democratic regime, further threatened the status and power of old-stock
Americans. The Protestant old-stock elite, in fact, were forced to retreat from their former
hegemonic position—that retreat was part of the transition to pluralist democracy—but they
refused to surrender either willingly or completely to the outsiders. Rather, they sought, in a
sense, to retrench: forced to retreat, they searched for positions where they could fortify and thus
protect their dominant (though no longer hegemonic) interests and values. One such position of
fortification was in the courts.181
During the 1930s, the Protestant old-stock elite turned to the judicial enforcement of
constitutional rights as a potential bulwark against the majoritarian threat posed by the (pluralist)
democratic empowerment of peripheral groups. In other words, old-stock Americans sought “the
constitutionalization of rights”—the designation of their own interests and values as
constitutional rights enforceable through the courts.182 When their interests and values were
constitutionalized as judicially sanctioned rights, they were effectively protected from the
vagaries of the democratic processes—democratic processes that now included peripheral groups
and that therefore dangerously encompassed the interests and values of those previously
excluded outsiders. 183 To be sure, during the Progressive and early New Deal eras, old-stock
181

See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 (1988) (arguing that liberal
reforms simultaneously transformed yet legitimated racist social structures).
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[T]he process of judicial empowerment through the constitutionalization of rights may
accelerate when the hegemony of ruling elites in majoritarian decision-making arenas is
threatened by “peripheral” groups. As such threats become severe, hegemonic elites who
possess disproportionate access to and influence upon the legal arena may initiate a
constitutional entrenchment of rights in order to transfer power to the courts. This
process of conscious judicial empowerment in relatively open, rule-of-law polities is
likely to occur when the judiciary's public reputation for political impartiality and
rectitude is relatively high and when the courts are likely to rule, by and large, in
accordance with the cultural propensities of the hegemonic community. In other words,
judicial empowerment through the constitutional fortification of rights may provide an
efficient institutional way for hegemonic sociopolitical forces to preserve their hegemony
and to secure their policy preferences even when majoritarian decision-making processes
are not operating to their advantage.
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elites had sought to protect their economic interests through judicial review, an effort that
produced some of the famous Lochner-era decisions, such as Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,
holding that a minimum wage law violated liberty of contract.184 But even when the old-stock
elites were forced to retreat in 1937—when economic regulation became subject to mere rational
basis review185—they still sought to protect their interests and values through the judicial
enforcement of other rights and liberties, including free expression and religious freedom. This
strategy contributed to the judicial invigoration of first-amendment freedoms.
It was not coincidental, then, that in the 1940s the Protestant-controlled Supreme Court
incorporated the religion clauses to apply against state and local governments through the due
process clause.186 By this time, American Catholics constituted the largest Christian group in the
nation; the total number of Protestants still far outnumbered Catholics, but Catholics nonetheless
outnumbered the largest Protestant denomination.187 A judicially invigorated establishment
clause, now applicable against state and local governments, provided Protestant refuge from the
potential reach of Catholic political power within the pluralist democratic regime. For example,
Id. at 95.
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261 U.S. 525 (1923). Other examples include the following: United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v.
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Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating establishment
clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating free exercise clause). On
the makeup of the Supreme Court, see Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First
Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 222, 232 & n.41
(2003). Helpful sources on Protestant-Catholic relations and their implications for the Supreme
Court’s religion-clause decisions include the following: Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and
Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 121 (2001); John C. Jeffries & James E.
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States and Canada 312 (1977).
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in cases challenging governmental aid to nonpublic (predominantly Catholic) schools, the
Supreme Court invalidated the governmental action nearly twice as often as it upheld the
action.188 Wherever Catholic and Protestant interests and values diverged, the religion clauses
offered a judicially enforceable mechanism that Protestants could invoke to prevent or retard the
imposition of Catholic views through democratic processes.189
But not all constitutional rights are created equal. The Supreme Court justices did not
(and do not) treat all claims for the protection of individual rights similarly. In fact, the Court
favored free expression over religious freedom claims partly because of the status of the
claimants vis-à-vis the justices and the Protestant mainstream. Significantly, while many
claimants in first-amendment cases from the 1930s and 1940s were outsiders, the salience of
such claimants as outsiders varied with the particular context of each case.190 In other words, the
188

See Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, & Mark V. Tushnet,
Constitutional Law 1494-1503 (2d ed. 1991) (listing cases); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 186, at
288-89 (emphasizing Supreme Court’s determination to inhibit aid to parochial schools). Jeffries
and Ryan write:
[A] ban against aid to religious schools was supported by the great bulk of the Protestant
faithful. With few exceptions, Protestant denominations, churches, and believers
vigorously opposed aid to religious schools. For many Protestant denominations, this
position followed naturally from the circumstances of their founding. It was strongly
reinforced, however, by hostility to Roman Catholics and the challenge they posed to the
Protestant hegemony, which prevailed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In its political origins and constituencies, the ban against aid to religious
schools aimed not only to prevent an establishment of religion but also to maintain one.
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 186, at 282.
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Berg, supra note 186, at 123-51; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 186, at 312-27.

See Lichtman, supra note 32, at 73-76 (stressing how the salience of prejudice against
different groups of outsiders can vary over time, depending on a variety of conditions). Helpful
social science resources on ingroup-outgroup relations and prejudices include the following:
Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time, 17
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 475 (1991); Marilynn B. Brewer & Sherry K.
Schneider, Social Identity and Social Dilemmas: A Double-edged Sword, in Social Identity
Theory 169 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990); Johan M.G. van der Dennen,
Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group Differentiation: A Review and Interpretation of the
Literature, in The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism 1 (Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger, & Ian
Vine eds., 1986); Samuel L. Gaertner, Jeffrey Mann, Audrey Murrell, & John F. Dovidio,
Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of Recategorization, 57 J. Personality & Social
Psychology 239 (1989); Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer, Categorization Effects on
Ingroup and Outgroup Perception, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism 209 (John F.
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degree of insider or old-stock prejudice against peripheral groups was not a constant; it
fluctuated with the circumstances. Most important, then, the salience of a claimant as an outsider
tended to be more intense in religious-freedom (especially free-exercise) than in free-expression
cases.
Social science research demonstrates that ingroup-outgroup differentiation tends to define
an individual’s social identity: one’s membership in significant social groups or categories
largely determines personal identity, values, and perceptions.191 Individuals “tend to perceive
themselves as having similar or identical goals to members of their own group and different or
opposed goals to members of other groups.”192 Even an individual’s perception of self-interest

Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds. 1986) [hereinafter Miller & Brewer, Categorization]; James
Sidanius, The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression: A Social
Dominance Perspective, in Explorations in Political Psychology 183 (Shanto Iyengar & William
J. McGuire eds., 1993); Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup
Behavior, in Psychology of Intergroup Relations 7 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds.
2d ed. 1986); Wolfgang Tönnesmann, Group Identification and Political Socialisation, in The
Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism 175 (Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger, & Ian Vine eds., 1986);
John C. Turner, The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behaviour, in Intergroup
Behavior 66 (John C. Turner & Howard Giles eds., 1981).
191

Tajfel & Turner, supra note 190, at 7-24; Brewer & Miller, Beyond, supra note 190, at
281-82. “[I]ngroup favoritism and outgroup hostility are seen as consequences of the unit
formation between self and other ingroup members and the linking of one’s identity to them.”
Miller & Brewer, Categorization, supra note 190, at 213. “[P]sychological group membership is
first of all a perceptual and cognitive affair, and … an emotional involvement with the group
may follow as a consequence of the perceived group membership.” Tönnesmann, supra note
190, at 184.
For discussions of the problems of identifying group membership, see Umberto Melotti,
In-group/Out-group Relations and the Issue of Group Selection, in The Sociobiology of
Ethnocentrism 94 (Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger, & Ian Vine eds., 1986); Gary R. Johnson,
Susan H. Ratwik, & Timothy J. Sawyer, The Evocative Significance of Kin Terms in Patriotic
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L. Rev. 419, 451-53 (2001).
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Turner, supra note 190, at 97. Membership in a cultural group can shape an
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varies with the salience of intergroup divisions.193 “People favor in-group members in the
allocation of rewards, in their personal regard, and in the evaluation of the products of their
labor.”194 Unsurprisingly, then, individuals tend to discriminate against outgroup members—
often even if no tangible benefit will be realized.195 Empirical evidence shows that “an
individual will discriminate against a member of an out-group even when there is no conflict of
interest and there is no past history of intergroup hostility.”196 But when tangible conflicts arise
between ingroup and outgroup members, or when the outgroup’s actions frustrate the ingroup,
two important consequences follow. First, the conflict is likely to enhance the cohesion or
solidarity among the ingroup members (as well as the cohesion among the outgroup
members).197 Second, the conflict is likely to increase the salience of the division between the
groups; ingroup prejudice against the outgroup therefore is likely to intensify.198 “When and
193

“The self-concept is expandable and contractable across different levels of social
identity with associated transformations in the definition of self and the basis for self-evaluation.
When the definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also
changes accordingly.” Brewer, supra note 190, at 476; accord Brewer & Schneider, supra note
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Even basic cognitive processes are shaped by cultural memberships. Richard E. Nisbett,
Kaiping Peng, Incheol Choi, & Ara Norenzayan, Culture and Systems of Thoughts: Holistic
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Id. at 9; Tönnesmann, supra note 190, at 184. As Johan M.G. van der Dennen writes,
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Dennen, supra note 190, at 17 (emphasis added).
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which group memberships become salient for the individual depend on situational factors;”
explains Wolfgang Tönnesmann.199 “[O]ne could almost say that they are ‘switched on’ in
particular situations (like going into a ballot booth or watching a football match between two
national teams), and then determine how the situation is experienced by an individual and how
he reacts to the people around him.”200
Apparently, then, one reason the Court favored free expression over religious freedom is
that religion-clause claims were more likely to “switch on” the justices’ ingroup (Protestant, oldstock, elite) prejudices against the outsider (peripheral, outgroup) claimant.201 Many of the free
expression and religious freedom cases from the 1930s and 1940s involved claimants from
peripheral groups. Indeed, as the Jehovah's Witnesses cases reveal, the same claimant often
invoked both free expression and religious freedom. But the respective claims were qualitatively
distinctive. When an outsider invoked the free-expression component of the first amendment, he
or she was likely to describe free expression as a principle that applies equally to all. The
outsider, from this perspective, did not seek any special treatment; rather, he or she sought to be
treated the same as other citizens. But when that same outsider invoked religious freedom—
particularly the free-exercise component of the first amendment—the claim amounted to a
request for special treatment because of religious differences (from the mainstream).202
199

Tönnesmann, supra note 190, at 184. It should be noted that an individual can identify
with several different groups, any one of which might become more salient at a particular time.
Id. at 183.
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See id. at 184 (discussing how the salience of group membership is “switched on” in
accordance with various situations); cf., Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia In American Courts,
97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1497, 1499-1501 (2003) (discussing how xenophobic prejudices influence
jury decision making).
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In other words, religious insiders (mainstream Christians) would view free exercise
claims as requests for special treatment precisely because the outsider-claimant’s religion
differed from mainstream Christianity’s normative content. I thank Lew Schlosser for
underscoring this point. Cf., Lewis Z. Schlosser, Christian Privilege: Breaking a Sacred Taboo,
31 J. Multicultural Counseling & Development 44 (2003) (emphasizing how American society
propagates Christian privilege vis-à-vis non-Christian religions).
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Most free-exercise claimants request a judicial exemption from a generally applicable
law. In such a situation, the government has adopted a general law—not one specifically
focused on religion—but this general law nonetheless interferes with the practices or beliefs of
members of a minority religion. For instance, in Goldman v. Weinberger,203 the Air Force had
adopted a regulation prohibiting the wearing of a hat or other head covering in certain
circumstances. Religious convictions, however, mandate that Orthodox Jews always keep their
heads covered (by wearing, for example, a yarmulke or skull-cap). Goldman, an Orthodox
Jewish Air Force officer, thus sought a free-exercise exemption so that he could follow his
religious convictions while remaining in the Air Force.204 The crux of such a free-exercise
exemption claim is difference from the mainstream. Goldman would not have sought a freeexercise exemption but for the fact that Orthodox Jews, unlike most Christians, are compelled to
wear head coverings. Indeed, members of mainstream religions will rarely seek a free-exercise
exemption because generally applicable laws infrequently conflict with their practices or
beliefs.205 The legislators (or other law makers) either belong to or are fully aware of the
mainstream religions and thus are unlikely to adopt laws that interfere with mainstream practices
and beliefs. But when the religious outsider seeks a free-exercise exemption, she does so
precisely because of the differences between her religion and the mainstream.
Putting this in different terms, the free-exercise (outsider) claimant necessarily places
herself in conflict with the mainstream as manifested in the generally applicable law. Moreover,
203

475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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The Court rejected Goldman’s claim. The majority misleadingly referred to his desire
to wear a yarmulke as a personal preference. Id. at 508.
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Empirical studies show that members of mainstream religions are less likely to bring
free-exercise claims. James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals
Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 Am. Pol. Q. 236, 248 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael
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Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 491, 563-64 (2004). In the Sisk, Heise,
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were the claimants in only 1.7 percent of the cases. Sisk, supra, at 563, 577. I thank Greg Sisk
for underscoring this point for me.
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the claimant’s stance can potentially frustrate the (mainstream) purposes behind the general law.
This type of conflict and frustration is a burr likely to prickle the salience of the Supreme Court
justices’ ingroup-outgroup sensibilities. Consequently, in the 1930s and 1940s, when the justices
confronted a free-exercise claimant, they would have been likely to experience an intensified
sense of solidarity with the other justices as Protestant insiders, even if they normally were not
overly devout. Concomitantly, the justices would have perceived an increased salience of
separateness from the claimant—the claimant’s status as an outsider would be more distinct—
and the justices therefore would have been more likely to be prejudiced against the claimant and
her constitutional position. These same phenomena, moreover, could arise in establishmentclause cases, especially if the claim was framed in a manner highlighting religious divergence.206
Whether we care to admit it or not, religious differences can, in certain contexts, generate
salient divisions among Americans—including between Supreme Court justices and litigants.
Such divisions, moreover, either directly shape the justices’ reactions to religious-freedom cases
or otherwise influence the justices’ political stances, which in turn influence the justices’
applications of legal doctrines.207 But, as a general matter, how salient were religious divisions
in American society—particularly for the 1930s and 1940s? Evidence suggests an unambiguous
answer: under the right (or, we might say, wrong) conditions, religious divisions predominated
over other concerns. In an empirical study of the 1928 presidential election, Allan J. Lichtman
identified a number of “antagonisms that allegedly sundered the nation into two Americas during
the 1920s: Catholics versus Protestants, wets versus drys, immigrants versus natives, and city
versus country.”208 A contemporary campaign publication unabashedly highlighted these
divisions:
206
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If you believe in Anglo-Saxon Protestant domination; if you believe in those principles
which have made the country what it is; if you believe in prohibition, its observance and
enforcement, and if you believe in a further restricted immigration rather than letting
down the bars still lower, then whether you are a Republican or a Democrat, you will
vote for Hoover. …209
The 1928 election, of course, merits special historical import because it was the first time
one of the major political parties had nominated a Catholic, Al Smith, and Lichtman’s study
concludes that religion—the Protestant-Catholic divide—overrode all other antagonisms.210
Lichtman is careful to underscore that the salience of Protestant anti-Catholicism varies with
context.211 In 1928, Lichtman reasons, anti-Catholicism intensified precisely because a Catholic
ran for president. After 1928, anti-Catholicism persisted, but it receded to its more normal
level.212 Given this normal degree of Protestant prejudice against Catholics, the salience of antiCatholicism could always intensify under the proper conditions. And the proper conditions
would arise, as I have explained, in judicial cases involving religious freedom. The justices
would occasionally, behind closed doors, reveal their religious prejudices. For example, Justice
William O. Douglas passed a note to Justice Hugo Black during an oral argument complaining
that “[i]f the Catholics get public money to finance their religious schools, we better insist on
getting some good prayers in public schools or we Protestants are out of business.”213 Indeed, a
209
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supra note 32, at 40.
211

Id. at 73-76, 121. “Religion, more than any other attribute of voters, made the
coalitions supporting Smith and Hoover different from those that coalesced behind candidates in
earlier or in later years.” Id. at 25.
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The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985): The Private Discussions Behind
Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions 401 n.26 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (discussing Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). For discussions of additional anti-Catholic statements
by various Supreme Court justices, see Berg, supra note 186, at 129; John T. McGreevy,
Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84 J.
Am. Hist. 97, 122-26 (1997). It is worth noting that the appointments of New Deal justices like
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recent empirical study of religious-freedom cases in the lower federal courts from 1986 through
1995 concludes that “the single most prominent, salient, and consistent influence on judicial
decisionmaking was religion—religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the background of
the judge, and the demographics of the community.”214
One reason, then, that the Protestant-controlled Supreme Court favored free expression
over religious freedom during the 1930s and 1940s was that the religious-freedom claims were
more likely than the free-expression claims to intensify the salience of the justices’ separation
from the claimants as outsiders. In the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, when a claimant invoked free
expression, the justices could readily perceive the value of a broad principle of free expression
for Protestant elites as well as for members of peripheral groups. Indeed, for Protestant elites,
the development of a broad principle of free expression might be especially worthwhile given the
threat of outsider political power in the emergent pluralist democratic regime. But when
Jehovah's Witnesses invoked religious freedom, their own focus on religion was likely to
provoke the justices’ religious prejudices against the claimants as outsiders.215 Putting this in
different terms, a religious freedom claim was, most often, integrally tied to a Jehovah's
Witness’s status as an outsider—a member of a discrete and insular (religious) minority.216 With
a free expression claim, the claimant was still an outsider, a Jehovah's Witness, but the crux of
Douglas and Black, members of the Protestant elite, were due in part to Catholic political support
for the New Deal. This irony suggests that while certain Protestants and Catholics might have a
congruence of interests in some circumstances, the Protestants’ anti-Catholicism can become
more salient in other contexts. I thank Mark Tushnet for bringing this point to my attention.
214
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“[T]he salience of relevant categorizations” is “an important factor” in determining
“intergroup bias.” Gaertner, supra note 190, at 246. It is worth noting that in many of these
cases, a decision based on religious freedom could be construed as narrower than one based on
free expression. That is, the granting of a free-exercise exemption would not sweep as broadly
as the articulation of a principle of free expression, yet the justices would nonetheless rely on the
broader ground of decision. Such reliance on a broader rather than narrower ground runs
contrary to the usual rules of judicial decision making, thus suggesting that the justices sought to
resolve these cases in ways that favored the mainstream (rather than the outsiders). I thank Alan
Chen for raising this point.
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the claim rarely was that status, as an outsider qua outsider. Consequently, Jehovah's Witnesses
were more likely to emerge victorious when they stressed and the justices focused on free
expression rather than religious freedom.217
IV. Conclusion
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court confronted and contributed to a
transition from republican to pluralist democracy. The hallmark of republican democracy had
been the virtuous pursuit of the common good. Governmental actions for partial or private
interests were impermissible. Under pluralist democracy, though, the republican democratic
principles, virtue and the common good, were supplanted; from the pluralist democratic
standpoint, they had been a facade for Protestant old-stock interests and values and, as such, had
been used to impede or prevent the participation of peripheral groups in the American polity.
Under pluralist democracy, all individuals and groups supposedly were to participate, to express
their interests and values through democratic institutions. Politics was about building coalitions,
jostling for advantages, compromising when necessary, and generally seeking to maximize the
satisfaction of one’s interests.
As the Court encountered the emerging pluralist democratic regime in the 1930s and
1940s, both constitutional theory and constitutional politics contributed to the development of
individual rights and liberties. On the one hand, first-amendment freedoms in general were
invigorated, but on the other hand, the justices favored free expression over religious freedom.
The developing theory of pluralist democracy readily justified an expansive concept of free
expression. An individual could not be a full and equal democratic participant unless she could
freely gather information about political issues and unrestrainedly express her interests and
217

Religious freedom encompasses both free exercise and anti-establishment claims. Free
exercise claims almost always accentuate the religious differences of the claimant, while
establishment clause claims can accentuate difference to a greater or lesser extent, partly
depending on how the claim is framed. My analysis suggests that an establishment clause claim
has a better chance for success if the claimant underscores his or her religious similarities to the
mainstream (rather than differences). See Feldman, supra note 186, at 238-61 (discussing
strategies of Jewish organizations in Supreme Court briefs).
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values in the democratic arena. Yet, the theoretical relationship between pluralist democracy and
religious freedom seemed more ambiguous. While numerous theories could be offered to justify
the protection of religious freedom, no single theory enjoyed widespread support. Partly for this
reason, the justices imbued free expression rather than religious freedom with the greater vitality.
Constitutional politics further contributed to this preference for expression over religion.
As the pluralist democratic regime solidified, the Protestant old-stock elite, aided by the
Protestant-controlled Supreme Court, constitutionalized their interests and values, particularly in
first-amendment freedoms, so as to form a bulwark against the emergent political power of
peripheral groups. But through this constitutionalization of rights, the justices differentiated free
expression and religious freedom. When a case highlighted the outsider-claimant’s difference
from the mainstream—as would happen often in religious-freedom cases—the justices were less
likely to uphold the constitutional claim. Meanwhile, in those cases where the Court upheld the
first-amendment claim, the justices were most likely to view the claimants’ practices as similar
to mainstream practices and interests. For example, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court
invalidated an ordinance proscribing door-to-door distributions of written materials as applied to
a Jehovah's Witness.218 Focusing on free expression, Justice Black’s majority opinion
emphasized how the Witnesses’ method, the door-to-door distribution of literature, resonated
with mainstream practices.
The widespread use of this method of communication by many groups espousing various
causes attests its major importance. … Many of our most widely established religious
organizations have used this method of disseminating their doctrines, and laboring groups
have used it in recruiting their members. The federal government, in its current war bond
selling campaign, encourages groups of citizens to distribute advertisements and circulars
from house to house. [As] every person acquainted with political life knows, door to
door campaigning is one of the most accepted techniques of seeking popular support. …
218

319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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If the Court were occasionally to find the actions of a peripheral group to be protected under the
first amendment, these types of actions—fitting so harmoniously with the interests, values, and
practices of the mainstream—were ideal.219
Finally, while the Court’s treatment of free-expression and religious-freedom claims over
the last half-century has been anything but consistent, the Court today clearly favors free
expression over religious freedom.220 In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith,221 decided in 1990, the Court considered the appropriate test for free-exercise
challenges to laws of general applicability. The Court expressly rejected the strict scrutiny test,
which required the government to show that its action was necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. Instead, the Court held that the “political process” should effectively
determine the scope of free-exercise rights.222 The Court, however, articulated three exceptions,
when strict scrutiny would be appropriate: first, if the government intentionally discriminates
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In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court struck down a license fee as applied to
Jehovah's Witnesses who were distributing written materials door-to-door. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
Justice Douglas’s majority opinion linked free expression and religious freedom, and in doing so,
he accentuated how the Witnesses’ practices harmonized with mainstream traditions. “We do
not intimate or suggest in respecting [the Witnesses’] sincerity that any conduct can be made a
religious rite and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First Amendment,” Douglas
explained. Id. at 109. “We only hold that spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the
Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old
type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types.”
Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
The justices, moreover, seemed especially apt to uphold free-expression claims when the
disputed speech or writing attacked a peripheral group. For example, in Near v. Minnesota, only
the second clear free-speech victory, the Court found the disputed writings, which were laced
with antisemitic diatribes, to be protected. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the
Court found speech attacking the Catholic religion to be protected. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of
Free Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 361 (2004); Mark Tushnet,
The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71 (2001).
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Id. at 890.
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against religion;223 second, if the case involves the denial of unemployment compensation;224 and
third, if the case involves a “hybrid” claim, where free exercise is combined with some other
constitutional right.225 “The only decisions,” the Court wrote in explaining the hybrid-claims
exception, “in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as freedom of speech and of the press.”226 Because the first two exceptions will be
triggered only rarely, the hybrid-claims exception now appears to be the primary means for
invoking heightened judicial scrutiny.
Thus, while the current Court, as a general matter, rigorously protects free expression,
typically presuming that speech is protected unless it falls into a category of low-value
expression, religious freedom will most often be subject to the whims of the political process—
unless a free-exercise claim can be conjoined with another constitutional claim, particularly free
expression.227 Free exercise, as so interpreted, is a second-class constitutional right. Standing
alone, it is unlikely to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny; in most instances, courts will merely
defer to legislative judgments. Predictably, subsequent to Smith, cases involving religion have
often been construed to raise free-expression issues, thus better justifying heightened scrutiny.228
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Id. at 877-78; e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (invalidating an animal cruelty law that had been interpreted to punish killings for
religious reasons).
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,
489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a
Christian who refused to work on Sundays but did not belong to established church or sect).
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 41 (1990) (discussing Smith exceptions).
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002), the Court also downgraded the
level of scrutiny to be applied in most establishment-clause cases. Feldman, supra note 186, at
261-65.
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Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the theoretical uncertainties surrounding religious freedom
under pluralist democracy, the Smith Court justified its holding by underscoring problems
inherent to a legal order under a pluralist democratic regime.229 “Any society adopting [a strict
scrutiny test to determine the constitutionality of a general law] would be courting anarchy, but
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs,” the Court
explained.230 “Precisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference,’ and precisely because we value and protect that
religious divergence,” the Court continued, “we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does
not protect an interest of the highest order.”231 In other words, exactly because pluralist
democracy rests on the inclusion of diverse societal groups within the American polity, the right
to religious freedom must be narrowed. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, government would be
hamstrung; nearly every general law would interfere with the practices or beliefs of some
obscure religious group—or so the Court suggested. Of course, as even the Smith Court
acknowledged, this approach to religious freedom favors the mainstream—a familiar result from
Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). A similar pre-Smith case is
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see Garry, supra note 220, at 385-88 (discussing cases
favoring free expression over religious freedom).
An empirical study concludes that, after Smith, lawyers shifted their strategies so as to
emphasize the expressive components of religious-freedom claims. “Before Smith, free speech
arguments were raised in only 12.9% of the cases we studied that involved claims for religious
accommodation, while the proportion of cases framed as involving expressive rights more than
doubled to 28.7% after Smith.” Sisk, supra note 205, at 570.
229

I do not mean to suggest that the reasons for the Court favoring free expression over
religious freedom are the same today as in the 1930s and 1940s. There are overlaps, but there
are also differences. For instance, the Court today is more religiously diverse than it has ever
before been, yet the evidence suggests that nowadays the degree of religiosity of a justice often
matters more than his or her religious affiliation. A conservative Protestant justice,
consequently, is more likely to have views consonant with a conservative Catholic justice than
with a liberal Protestant justice. Feldman, supra note 186, at 272-73; Sisk, supra note 205, at
579-81.
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the vantage of constitutional politics. “[L]eaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in,” the
Court explained plaintively, “but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must
be preferred.”232

232

Id. at 890. One thing that did not change during the transition from republican to
pluralist democracy was that the predominant understanding of religious freedom favored the
religious mainstream. Yet, the nature of religious freedom, including its relation to free
expression, otherwise changed in many ways and for many reasons, including the increased
religious diversity of the nation and the increased number of religious-freedom cases to reach the
Supreme Court during the twentieth century.

